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Chapter 6
The University of California Voluntary
Early Retirement Incentive Programs
Ellen Switkes

Public colleges and universities face considerable challenges in preserving
and maintaining their missions and their operations while coping with serious budget problems. The economy of the state, state budget appropriations, and federal research funding are of enormous importance to the very
core of the institution and its faculty and students, although the institution
can impact these only peripherally if at all. Salaries of faculty and staﬀ make
up the majority of university spending, and in a budget crisis there are only
limited ways to tighten the collective belt without reducing the payroll. Delayed hiring may have some eﬀect, and hiring freezes are a common method
of dealing with temporary or short-term crises. Reduction in the workforce
through layoﬀ or retirement incentives may be needed if the budget crisis is
severe and prolonged. Such actions may address budget problems, but they
engender grave concerns over program quality and continuity.
The University of California (UC) faced a serious budget crisis in the early
1990s and responded to it by instituting a series of Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Programs (VERIPs). These programs were designed to encourage retirement of staﬀ and faculty in order to reduce the payroll sufﬁciently to deal with the looming budget crisis. The institutional planners
could only guess at the outcome and impact of these programs, because
they had little experience with retirement incentive programs and could not
know how attractive the incentives would be to faculty and staﬀ. Nor did
they know, as the budget crisis developed, how long it would continue and
how deep it would eventually cut. Balancing incentives to encourage sufﬁcient reduction in workforce without decimating academic programs was
the challenge, and there was little guidance available to the planners. The
premise behind VERIPs was fairly simple: encourage retirement of faculty
and staﬀ to reduce the payroll through voluntary employee actions, replace
as few employees as possible until the budget crisis eased, and later replace
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them with junior personnel at lower salaries. At the same time, the university needed to maintain the quality of instruction for students; maintain the
university’s ongoing research programs; maintain the University of California as a destination of choice for excellent undergraduate and graduate students and for new faculty recruits; and also maintain the prestige of academic programs with high quality scholarships. How could these seemingly
conﬂicting objectives be accomplished?
The University of California experienced reductions in state appropriations of over 20 percent from 1990 to 1996. In response to these dramatic
budget cuts, in 1991 the university oﬀered the ﬁrst in what was to become a
series of three VERIPs. More than 10,000 staﬀ and 2,000 tenured faculty retired in these programs. Those 2,000 tenured faculty members constituted
over 20 percent of all regular faculty. This chapter describes the incentives
oﬀered, a proﬁle of faculty who were eligible and of those who elected these
programs, and information on the impact on the university’s academic programs.
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The Retirement System
The University of California is a system with nine campuses and over 150,000
students. The University of California retirement plan (UCRP) is a deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plan with over 115,000 active members, 30,000 annuitants,
and 21,000 inactive members eligible to receive a beneﬁt. The deﬁned beneﬁt pension formula is determined by years of service, the average of the
highest consecutive three years’ salary highest average plan compensation
(HAPC), and a factor based on age. Because of outstanding performance of
investments of the university’s retirement plan, neither the employees nor
the university made retirement contributions to the plan since 1990. The incentives as well as all of the costs associated with administering the VERIP
programs were borne by the retirement system and were not paid from the
university’s operating budget.
Figure 1 shows the age factors in place during the VERIPs. The minimum
retirement age is 50. The age factors increase in a nonlinear fashion and
reach a maximum at age 60. After age 60, the age factor remains constant
but years of service and HAPC continue to increase until retirement. For example, if Professor Jones retired at age 57 with 16 years of university service
and a three highest years average salary of $75,000, the standard pension
(P) upon retirement of $20,400 would be calculated based on the age factor
for age 57 (0.0170) as P = (0.0170)(16 years)($75,000) = $20,400.
In addition to the university pension, many faculty and staﬀ who retired
also received social security beneﬁts, 403(b) distributions, and almost all
were eligible for annuitant health insurance on a basis comparable to active
employees. (This latter aﬀords a substantial incentive to retire.)
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Figure 1. Deﬁned beneﬁt plan age factors in eﬀect during the VERIP programs.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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The Budget Crisis
Figure 2 shows the change over time in the university’s budget, enrollment,
and faculty numbers during the period preceding and following the deep
budget cuts. From 1990 to 1994, the university experienced a budget cut
of almost 20 percent, while at the same time the student enrollment decreased only slightly. Also marked in this ﬁgure are the three VERIP programs. Budget appropriations for the University of California grew steadily
from 1985–86 to 1990–91; substantial enrollment growth spurred aggressive
faculty hiring, capital projects, and campus expansion around the system.
When the budget crisis hit, a reduction in workforce was the most feasible
way to deal with such substantial budget cuts in such a timely and eﬀective
way. While layoﬀs of other staﬀ could have been eﬀected, it was impossible
to lay oﬀ suﬃciently large numbers of tenured faculty within a short time
to meet substantial salary saving targets. When the ﬁrst VERIP program was
announced in October 1990, the budget crisis was still young and the total
reduction in workforce that would ultimately be needed wasn’t yet known.
The university had little experience with large-scale workforce reductions. The VERIP program was designed based on what turned out to be
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Figure 2. University of California faculty count, student enrollment, and California
state budget, 1986–97. Source: Author’s calculations.

rather good guesses about the kinds of incentives that would encourage retirement without decimating the workforce. In fact, the university’s faculty
senate provided substantial support for the incentive plan, in large part because of the anticipated opportunity for a large-scale faculty renewal. In
fact, substantial hiring of new faculty was delayed for several years as the
budget crisis continued to deepen.
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The Incentive Programs
Figure 3 is a time line for the VERIP programs. VERIP 1 was announced in
October 1990. Faculty were required to make a binding decision by March
31, 1991 and to retire on July 1, 1991. VERIPs 2 and 3 were announced in
July 1992 and June 1993 respectively, with retirement dates for faculty of
January 1, 1993 and July 1, 1994. Each VERIP was anticipated to be the ﬁnal
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Figure 3. VERIP timeline faculty programs. Source: Author’s calculations.

program. Eligible employees were presented with the choice to take the program oﬀered in a window period or to continue in active employment. Each
successive program provided broadened eligibility requirements to encourage retirements in response to a worsening state budget forecast. Some employees who selected the earlier programs were unhappy to learn later that
if they had chosen not to retire when they did, they could have elected the
last program with more valuable incentives. However, by the time VERIP 3
was oﬀered, the incentives were suﬃciently generous that a large number
of employees elected the program rather than wait for the possibility that
an even richer program would be oﬀered later.
Figure 4 describes the three VERIP programs for faculty. Faculty who
were subject to mandatory retirement were permitted to retire with the incentives provided in VERIPs 1 and 2, even though they would have had to
retire anyway. Mandatory retirement was no longer in place at the time of
VERIP 3.
In the ﬁrst VERIP, faculty with a sum of age plus service of 80 or above
were eligible. In the example above, Professor Jones at age 57 with 16 years
of service had age plus service of 73 and was not eligible, while faculty colleagues age 60 with 20 or more years of service were eligible. For VERIP 2,
faculty needed a combination of age and years of service of 78 to be eligible;
for VERIP 3, faculty needed a combination of age and years of service of 73
to be eligible. Three years later Professor Jones was eligible for VERIP 3. At
that point she was 60 years old with 19 years of service, so her age plus service equaled 79. Program eligibility for staﬀ employees was more generous.
A special set of incentives was established for VERIP 3 for the Berkeley campus because the faculty at this campus had higher average age and service
than the rest of the system. The administration was concerned that a very
high take rate at Berkeley could create a crisis by jeopardizing important
academic programs.
Incentive. Figure 4 shows the incentives oﬀered to faculty under each
VERIP program. All three programs provided a lump sum cash payment
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Figure 4. Faculty eligibility requirements, retirement incentives, and retirement
dates. Source: Author’s calculations.

equivalent to three months salary immediately upon retirement as a transition allowance, subject to Internal Revenue Code Section 415 limitations.
In addition, faculty who elected VERIP 1 or 2 received ﬁve years of service
credit. For a professor with 15 years of University of California service, adding 5 years of service credit would result in a pension formula crediting 20
years of service rather than 15 years, resulting in a 33 percent increase in
pension. For VERIP 3, the incentives were more complicated as they were
based on both an increase in age and service totaling eight. Faculty could
add up to three years of age plus ﬁve years of service credit. For Berkeley,
the numbers were two years and six years respectively.
Examples of the impact of VERIP 3 on retirement beneﬁts for three ﬁctitious faculty are shown in Figure 5. These illustrate how the incentives might
inﬂuence an individual’s decision to accept the incentive and to retire.
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Professor Holst was age 68 at the time she elected VERIP 3. She had
been eligible for VERIP 1 and 2 but had not retired. Because the age factor reaches a maximum at age 60, Professor Holst had already reached
the maximum age factor; additional age credit would not increase her
pension. Thus Holst received an incentive of eight additional years of
service, which resulted in a 27 percent increase in her pension from an
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Figure 5. Examples of impact of VERIP 3 on retirement beneﬁts. Source: Author’s
calculations.

.
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annual beneﬁt of $65,793 to a beneﬁt under VERIP 3 of $83,338. Had
she not retired under VERIP 3, she ﬁgured that with a merit increase
of about 9 percent every three years and no cost of living increases due
to the bad budget, she would have to work to age 73 or more to receive a pension similar to the one oﬀered to her now at age 68. She had
been thinking about retiring soon anyway, and so she took the oﬀered
incentive.
Professor Ramos was age 55 with 20 years service when VERIP 3 was
oﬀered. He hadn’t been eligible for VERIP 1 or 2. VERIP 3 changed
his pension calculation by adding three years of age and ﬁve years of
service to provide a pension 50 percent greater than he would receive
if he retired without VERIP at age 55. A signiﬁcant factor in his decision to retire was the possibility that he might later be recalled to partial
active service and could retain his oﬃce, graduate students and research
grants. Although no guarantees of recall could be made due to retirement plan restrictions, he was reasonably conﬁdent that his expertise
would be needed, so the prospect of ‘‘retiring’’ without totally giving up
his work was quite attractive.
Professor King was age 57 when he considered electing VERIP 3. He
also had not been eligible for VERIP 1 or 2. King’s incentive of three
additional years of age credit to age 60 (the maximum age factor) and
ﬁve years of service credit increased his total years of service from 16
to 21. Under VERIP 3 his pension would increase to $37,957; it would
have been at $20,400 if he had retired without the added incentives.
This was an overall increase of 86 percent in his pension at retirement.
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However, King ﬁgured that the increase in the age factor from age 57 to
60 combined with a substantial merit increase he was expecting would
give him the equivalent of the VERIP 3 beneﬁt with a few more years of
work. He was not ready to retire at age 57 and anticipated working many
more years, so the VERIP 3 incentive was not suﬃciently attractive to
Professor King.
The campaign. The university undertook an extensive information campaign with each VERIP program. All eligible employees received a package
of information about the VERIP program including individualized statements of what their pension would be if they elected the program. In addition, there were information sessions to which spouses were invited, videos
describing the program, and individual retirement counseling for all professors and spouses.
Faculty had many factors to consider in addition to the ﬁnancial arrangements of their university pension, such as additional income available from
other sources, their health and the health of family members, postretirement plans, recall possibilities, and opportunities for other employment.
Many faculty were relieved to ﬁnd the time in retirement to complete a book
manuscript, to become more active in their professional societies, or to assume leadership roles in faculty governance. Many were happy about opportunities to teach without having to attend department meetings or serve
on committees. Although the university was unable to make any guarantees
about future part-time appointments, many faculty considered this a likely
option.
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Outcome
There were several variables across the three VERIP programs. The demographics of eligible faculty for each VERIP program was diﬀerent. The eligibility criteria varied as each succeeding VERIP made more faculty eligible;
in addition, many formerly eligible faculty had already retired with each successive VERIP oﬀering. In addition, each successive VERIP left a group of
eligible faculty less inclined to retire (Pencavel 1997).
Figure 6 shows the take rate for faculty for each VERIP program. This
varied from 18 percent for VERIP 2 to 34 percent for VERIP 3. VERIP 2 had
a lower take rate because although more people were eligible for VERIP 2
than for VERIP 1, those newly eligible had less seniority and many did not
want to retire because their pension, even enhanced by the incentive, was
too small. Many faculty were eligible for more than one of the VERIP programs. Overall, of those faculty eligible for any of the programs, 40 percent
(which amounted to 2,000 tenured faculty) took advantage of one of the
VERIP programs and retired.
The average age of faculty who retired for VERIP 1 was 66 (about the nor-
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Figure 6. Faculty VERIP participants by program. Source: Author’s calculations.

mal retirement age for University faculty). For VERIP 3 the average retirement age was 62, so a younger group of faculty retired with the changes in
eligibility and with the added incentive of this third program.
Figure 7 shows the take rate for various age ranges. Not surprisingly, older
eligible faculty tended to retire at a higher rate than younger eligible faculty.
Of special interest is the group who were 70 or older and eligible for one
or more VERIP programs. This group had the highest take rate of all; 110
of the 145 who were eligible chose to retire. However, the remaining 35 (24
percent) who did not retire might have to work for up to eight more years
before their pension would equal that oﬀered under VERIP 3.
The average age of those eligible for a VERIP program who did not retire
was 60, and the average age of those who retired under these programs was
63.5. Those with more years of service also had a higher take rate, but this
eﬀect was surprisingly modest. The average years of service of those eligible
who did not retire was 25.5 and of those who did retire was 26.6 years.
Campus variation. Overall, 1,984 ladder-rank faculty retired under all three
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Figure 7. Acceptance rates of VERIP eligible faculty by age. Source: University of
California, Oﬃce of the President, Academic Aﬀairs.

VERIP programs. In April 1991 when the ﬁrst election took place, the University’s regular faculty numbered 9,802. By July 1994, more than 20 percent
of those had retired under a VERIP program. In general, campuses with
older faculties had higher take rates. These varied from 13 percent at the
San Francisco health science campus to 27 percent at the Berkeley campus,
in spite of the decreased eligibility criteria under VERIP 3 at Berkeley.
Disciplinary variation. Early retirement incentive programs were available
to everyone who met the eligibility criteria. Growing or newer programs
such as molecular biology and ethnic studies tended to have younger faculty than did stable, long-established programs such as engineering and
physics. Reports after VERIP 1 were that engineering and physics programs
were seriously impacted. However, after all three VERIP programs were
completed, there were only small variations in take rate by discipline, as
shown in Figure 8. It should not be assumed that the take rates were uniform within disciplines across all nine campuses. In fact, within disciplines,
the pre-VERIP ages and years of service among faculty did vary across the
campuses. Figure 8 shows only the systemwide averages. It is interesting to

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 124 of 186

116

Ellen Switkes

Figure 8. Faculty count prior to ﬁrst VERIP, VERIP participants, and percent lost.
Source: University of California, Oﬃce of the President, Academic Aﬀairs.

note that disciplines where faculty might be expected to have other employment opportunities (such as engineering and computer science, biological
sciences, and health science) had lower take rates than other disciplines,
and humanities had the highest take rate of all.

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Proﬁles of the ‘‘Takers’’
It is diﬃcult to characterize those who took the retirement incentives. A
study of all UCLA faculty eligible for VERIP 3 examined publication output, and it found that the faculty with the most recent publications tended
to retire at a slightly lower rate than faculty with fewer recent publications
(Kim 1995). In addition, Figure 9 shows the variation of take rate with salary
step. At the University of California, faculty are assigned a rank and step to
chart their academic progress. Figure 9 shows the steps for the professor
rank. Faculty who make normal progress are advanced to a higher step at a
higher salary every three years. Thus, the salary step is a rough indicator of
academic progress. In addition, those who do not advance beyond step 5 to
higher levels are likely to have lower scholarly output. Faculty with higher
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Figure 9. Number and acceptance rates of VERIP 3 participants, full professors by
salary step. Promotions from step 5 to step 6 involved a more extensive and intensive
review process than for promotions to steps 2–5. Source: University of California,
Oﬃce of the President, Academic Aﬀairs.

salaries tended to be older and in general did have a higher take rate, and
faculty at step 5 did have a higher take rate than those at steps 6 and 7 (even
though those at higher steps might be substantially older). In fact, immediately after the VERIP programs ended, an informal count identiﬁed very
few faculty who retired under VERIP who then took regular full-time employment at other universities. One conclusion that may be drawn from this
information is that the most outstanding faculty who would likely be those
with other employment possibilities tended not to retire as readily as other
faculty, but the correlations were modest.
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After Retirement
After retirement, emeritus faculty tend to continue as active members of
the university in research, department activities, and/or Academic Senate
activities. The faculty who retired under the VERIP programs were no different. Prior to 1991, campuses recalled small numbers of faculty to active
service, mainly to teach speciﬁc courses. Subsequently, the number of recall
appointments increased and continues to remain high to meet the needs of
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instructional programs. At UCLA, most faculty who retired under VERIP remained active on campus at least immediately after they retired (Kim 1995).
Eighty percent were recalled to active service, a few on contract and grant
funds, but most were recalled to teach one or more courses, some without
salary. Because the hiring of new faculty slowed considerably during the
period of budgetary crisis, faculty who retired were often able to retain use
of their oﬃces and laboratories whether or not they were recalled to teach.
Emeritus faculty remained engaged in research, and this prompted the university to create a special title for faculty who had retired but who wanted to
apply for research grants and continued to have active research programs.
Immediately following retirement, some faculty took other full or part-time
work such as consulting, while only a small number retired completely from
professional life. In a follow-up study of VERIP retirees in 1998, almost 70
percent of respondents to their survey of VERIP retirees were still working either full or part time, including 40 percent who continued to work
part-time for the University of California (Kim 1998). The VERIP retirees
reported a very high degree of satisfaction with their decision to retire and
their current activities.
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Academic Program Continuity
Because of these incentive programs for retirement, almost 2,000 tenured
faculty left their university positions. Many had never planned their retirement. Others were in their late 50s and while they may have thought about
retirement, they had not been intending to retire within three months’ time,
although they ended up doing just that. Departments normally have long
notiﬁcation of impending faculty retirement and can plan an orderly succession, but with the VERIP programs, departments had little or no time
to plan. In addition, the timing of retirement for VERIP 2 was especially
disruptive to departmental operations. There were 371 faculty who elected
VERIP 2 in October 1992 who retired in the middle of the academic year,
just as the second term began in January 1993. Faculty and their departments had no time to plan for the upcoming term. A retirement date of July 1
was therefore selected for faculty for VERIP 3, even though continuing budgetary constraints forced the retirement date for staﬀ under VERIP 3 at an
earlier date of November 1, 1993.
The disruption following retirement of signiﬁcant numbers of faculty was
ultimately confronted in a variety of ways. Following a break in service, faculty were permitted to be rehired at less than half-time, and many were eager
to do so. Many retired faculty were willing to continue to teach on a recall
basis or as volunteers. The number of lecturers, adjunct faculty, and visiting
faculty showed little change. Almost no classes were canceled. The remaining faculty taught extra classes; some classes were larger when sections were
consolidated.
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Campuses were concerned that the departure of some of their most prestigious faculty would have an adverse eﬀect on the stature of their departments. However the eﬀect has generally been a positive one: stellar faculty
remained active in their departments following the retirement, and the sudden retirement of so many faculty provided a unique opportunity to examine long-range academic planning and organization goals. Several campuses
made diﬃcult organizational changes in the wake of the VERIP programs.
Overtime hiring of new faculty has been an overall beneﬁt, and some older
faculty cited the need for their departments to hire new faculty as among
their reasons for electing to retire.
In addition, more than 10,000 staﬀ employees retired under VERIP programs. This created problems for faculty as department support staﬀ took
advantage of the retirement incentive programs. On the other hand, research support staﬀ is generally funded from extramural sources, and unlike
state-supported staﬀ, money was available to replace those retired research
support staﬀ.
Although the deﬁned beneﬁt retirement system is no longer as well
funded as it was prior to the VERIP programs, faculty and staﬀ who remain
continue to make no direct contributions. The nature of the deﬁned beneﬁt
plan means that remaining employees will continue to receive the pension
to which they are entitled based on the deﬁned beneﬁt formula. In fact,
the age factor proﬁle has recently been changed from what it was during
the VERIP programs (see Figure 1) to provide a more generous age factor
for those from age 55 to 59, to ‘‘smooth’’ out the discontinuity in the age
factor that existed between age 59 and 60. Remaining employees are not
faced with the possibility of a reduced pension beneﬁt even though the retirement system was able to fund all aspects of the VERIP program. Another
complication has been the cost of replacing faculty.
As seen in Figure 10, as the budget crisis eased, faculty hiring has resumed to replace those faculty who retired with permanent new faculty.
Even though the salaries of incoming faculty are normally lower than the
faculty who retired, in many ﬁelds the cost of recruitment and start-up is
high. In fact in some ﬁelds, such as business and economics, the salaries of
new faculty may be even higher than initially forecasted.
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Conclusion
From many points of view, the VERIP programs sponsored by the University of California were clearly successful. These programs reduced the university’s payroll through voluntary retirement rather than through layoﬀ or
termination, mitigating the possibility of litigation. Generally, those who retired under these programs felt that they made the right decision. No one
was forced to retire, and the incentives were generous. The resulting payroll reduction was suﬃcient to deal with severe cuts in state funding from
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Figure 10. New appointments of ladder rank faculty. Source: University of California,
Oﬃce of the President, Academic Aﬀairs.

1991 to 1996. The university’s retirement system was able to ﬁnance all aspects of the incentive programs and the VERIP programs made it possible
to realize substantial savings in salary and beneﬁts. In addition, suﬃcient
resources remained in the pension fund to guarantee future deﬁned beneﬁts for remaining employees. By contrast, other universities must sometimes
ﬁnance early retirement programs from university operating funds, and this
can create serious funding problems in a budget crisis.
The University of California’s academic program weathered the temporary reduction in faculty and support staﬀ in a variety of ways. A major factor
was the willingness of many retired faculty to remain part of the university
community, to teach courses on a recall basis at low salaries or as volunteers, and to maintain laboratories and research projects as emeriti while
continuing to attract research grants and superb graduate students. Remaining faculty took on additional teaching and service responsibilities, and had
reduced staﬀ support. In addition, the mass retirement of so many faculty
in a short time provided a unique opportunity for campuses to consider
major organizational changes in academic programs. Positions vacated are
now being reﬁlled with new faculty with fresh perspectives and in emerging
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areas. The quality of the University of California’s academic programs today
seems to be as high or higher than it was at the beginning of the decade.
Each time a new VERIP program was oﬀered, the administration assured
faculty and staﬀ that it did not envision future programs. Although that was
indeed the expectation at the time each of the programs oﬀered, the continuing budgetary crisis necessitated three such programs. Were expectations raised of continued retirement incentive programs? Did faculty and
staﬀ defer their decision to retire in the expectation that something better
would come along? It is impossible to answer those questions. However
many faculty and staﬀ continue to inquire about the possibility of a new retirement incentive, though another one seems remote. The extreme budgetary circumstances that gave rise to the VERIP programs early in the decade
of the 1990s no longer exist.
In order to justify use of retirement system funds for a retirement incentive program, a surplus must exist, and the university would need to demonstrate a business necessity such as the one that arose in the early 1990s.
University employees have made no retirement contribution to the deﬁned
beneﬁt plan since 1990, but some time in the future, contributions will once
again be required. Without a dramatic and looming catastrophe, both active
employees and university administrators would be very displeased if retirement system funds were used for a retirement incentive, because that would
hasten the day when the employer and employees would again have to make
contributions to the deﬁned beneﬁt plan.
Additionally, the University of California is projecting an additional
63,000 students in the next 12 years, a 40 percent increase in the student
body. A program to encourage wholesale retirements of faculty and staﬀ at
this point would be contrary to anticipated staﬃng needs for this massive
enrollment increase. An employee beneﬁts update in the summer of 1999
carried the following sidebar: ‘‘So here’s the oﬃcial word: No more VERIPs
are anticipated at this time’’ (HR/Beneﬁts Review 1999).
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